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TWEAKING THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT: AN ARGUMENT 
AGAINST DURATIONAL-RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR 
ALCOHOL BEVERAGE WHOLESALERS AND RETAILERS 
INTRODUCTION 
Say you lived in Washington D.C. and owned a successful restaurant, the 
profitability of which depended in part on its wine, beer, and liquor sales. The 
restaurant was successful enough to begin looking for a second location. You 
determine that Bethesda, Maryland is an ideal location because it is only seven 
miles from your D.C. residence, but there is one problem: the Maryland Code of 
Alcoholic Beverages imposes a two-year durational-residency requirement on 
restaurant owners seeking a restaurant liquor license.1 In order to sell alcohol at 
the new restaurant, you have to establish a second residence in Bethesda, live 
there for two years, and face the associated costs. 
The Commerce Clause gives the U.S. Congress power to “regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States.”2 This affirmative grant of power 
 
 1. See MD. CODE ANN., Alcoholic Beverages § 4-109(a)(4) (West 2016) (requiring an 
applicant for a liquor license to have been a resident for the “2 years immediately before filing the 
application”); see also Aaron Kraut, Liquor License Residency Requirement a Hurdle to Some, 
BETHESDA MAG. (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.bethesdamagazine.com/Bethesda-Beat/2014/Liquor-
License-Residency-Requirement-A-Hurdle-To-Some/ [https://perma.cc/QBX9-QU53]. Maryland 
is not the only State that imposes durational-residency requirements on alcohol beverage 
wholesalers and/or retailers. In Tennessee, a retail liquor license may be issued only if you have 
been a “bona fide resident of [the] state during the two-year period immediately preceding the date 
upon which application is made.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-3-204(b)(2)(A) (West 2016). This statute 
was ruled unconstitutional by the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee in Byrd 
v. Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n, 259 F. Supp. 3d 785 (M.D. Tenn. 2017). The case has 
been appealed to the Sixth Circuit, but no decision had been issued at the time this Comment was 
due for publication. In Wisconsin, you must have resided continuously in the state for at least ninety 
days prior to the application date to qualify for any license related to alcohol beverages. WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 125.04(5)(a)(2) (West 2016). In Missouri, a corporation must be a “resident corporation” 
to obtain a wholesaler license. MO. REV. STAT. § 311.060.2(3) (2016). To be a “resident 
corporation,” the corporation must be incorporated under the laws of Missouri, and all of its officers 
and directors must be “bona fide residents” of Missouri for at least three years. Id. § 311.060.3. In 
Indiana, a corporation cannot obtain an “alcoholic beverage retailer’s permit of any type unless 
sixty percent (60%) of the outstanding common stock is owned by persons who have been 
continuous and bona fide residents of Indiana for five (5) years.” IND. CODE § 7.1-3-21-5(a) (2017); 
see also Greg Trotter, Binny’s Expansion to Indiana Thwarted by State Liquor Law Changes, CHI. 
TRIB. (Apr. 15, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-binnys-indiana-ex 
pansion-0417-biz-20160415-story.html [https://perma.cc/V6K4-537Q?type=image]. 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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implies a negative converse known as the dormant Commerce Clause, which 
prohibits the States from passing legislation that improperly burdens or 
discriminates against interstate commerce.3 Normally, when a state statute 
discriminates on its face, in its purpose, or in its effect against interstate 
commerce, a strict scrutiny test is applied, and the State must advance “a 
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives” in order to validate the statute.4 At a minimum, 
imposing a durational-residency requirement on alcohol beverage wholesalers 
and retailers discriminates in its effect against interstate commerce because it 
denies out-of-state residents access to the alcohol market on equal terms as in-
state residents.5 However, Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment can save 
state alcohol regulations, such as durational-residency requirements, from 
Commerce Clause scrutiny.6 Section 2 of the Amendment provides: “The 
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the 
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of 
the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”7 
 
 3. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626–28 (1978) (holding a state law 
unconstitutional because it discriminated against articles of interstate commerce); Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 145 (1970) (holding a state law unconstitutional because it 
improperly burdened interstate commerce); see also New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 
269, 273 (1988) (“It has long been accepted that the Commerce Clause not only grants Congress 
the authority to regulate commerce among the States, but also directly limits the powers of the 
States to discriminate against interstate commerce.”). 
 4. New Energy Co. of Ind., 486 U.S. at 278; see also Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628. A state 
statute that discriminates against interstate commerce faces a “virtually per se rule of invalidity.” 
Id. at 624. 
 5. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) 
(“‘Discrimination’ simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic 
interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”). A durational-residency requirement 
burdens out-of-state residents. An in-state resident either already meets the durational-residency 
requirement or it at least has more “in-state days” to put toward the requirement than an out-of-
state resident. 
 6. “Commerce Clause scrutiny” refers to both a strict scrutiny test and a Pike balancing test. 
If the statute regulates evenhandedly (i.e., it does not discriminate on its face, purpose, or effect) to 
advance the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens, but it still has some inadvertent or incidental 
impact on interstate commerce, then a Pike balancing test is applied. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
Under the Pike balancing test, the statute does not face a “virtually per se rule of invalidity.” 
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624. Rather, the statute is valid unless the burden on commerce is “clearly 
excessive” when measured against the state interest. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. In an effort to end Prohibition, Congress proposed the 
Twenty-first Amendment to the States, and on December 5, 1933, the requisite 3/4 of States ratified 
it through state ratifying conventions. Robert P. George, The Twenty-First Amendment, CONST. 
CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-xxi 
[https://perma.cc/3K9Y-D2Z9]. The Twenty-first Amendment is the only Amendment to have been 
ratified by state ratifying conventions. Id. 
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 Early Supreme Court cases interpreting Section 2 held that it gave the States 
authorization to discriminate against alcohol.8 This view slowly changed, and 
the Supreme Court has more recently held that the Twenty-first Amendment 
does not entirely remove state alcohol regulations from Commerce Clause 
scrutiny.  
To draw a conclusion . . . that the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow 
operated to “repeal” the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating 
liquors is concerned would, however, be an absurd oversimplification. If the 
Commerce Clause had been pro tanto “repealed,” then Congress would be left 
with no regulatory power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating 
liquor. Such a conclusion would be patently bizarre and is demonstrably 
incorrect.9 
Although the Twenty-first Amendment does not save all state alcohol 
regulations from Commerce Clause scrutiny, it has and continues to give the 
States significant power in how they design their alcohol distribution systems. 
Once the Amendment passed, many States developed a three-tier system of 
alcohol distribution, and now virtually every State has adopted it.10 The three 
tiers are: (1) the producer or supplier, (2) the distributor or wholesaler, and (3) 
the retailer.11 Typically, producers sell to in-state wholesalers, and the 
wholesalers pay excise taxes.12 In-state wholesalers sell to in-state retailers, such 
as the local liquor store, bar, or restaurant that sells alcohol.13 The retailers then 
sell to consumers and collect state sales tax.14 The “main purpose” of the three-
tiered system was to eliminate “the existence of a ‘tied’ system between 
producers and retailers, a system generally believed to enable organized crime 
 
 8. See State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936) (“The 
words used [in Section 2] are apt to confer upon the State the power to forbid all importations which 
do not comply with the conditions which it prescribes. The plaintiffs ask us to limit this broad 
command. They request us to construe the Amendment as saying, in effect: The State may prohibit 
the importation of intoxicating liquors provided it prohibits the manufacture and sale within its 
borders; but if it permits such manufacture and sale, it must let imported liquors compete with the 
domestic on equal terms. To say that, would involve not a construction of the Amendment, but a 
rewriting of it.” (emphasis added)); see also Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n 
of Mich., 305 U.S. 391, 394 (1939) (holding that “the right of a state to prohibit or regulate the 
importation of intoxicating liquor is not limited by the commerce clause”); Mahoney v. Joseph 
Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 403–04 (1938) (upholding a statute that “clearly discriminates in favor 
of liquor processed within the State as against liquor completely processed elsewhere”). 
 9. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 331–32 (1964). 
 10. Andrew Tamayo, What’s Brewing in the Old North State: An Analysis of the Beer 
Distribution Laws Regulating North Carolina’s Craft Breweries, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2198, 2204 
(2010). 
 11. Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 187 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Tamayo, supra 
note 10, at 2204. 
 12. Arnold’s Wines, 571 F.3d at 187; see also Tamayo, supra note 10, at 2200–01, 2204. 
 13. Tamayo, supra note 10, at 2201, 2204. 
 14. Arnold’s Wines, 571 F.3d at 187; see also Tamayo, supra note 10, at 2204. 
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to dominate the industry.”15 Curbing alcohol consumption was another goal of 
the three-tier system.16 However, some States use their regulatory power under 
the three-tier system to impose durational-residency requirements on alcohol 
beverage wholesalers and retailers.17 
This Comment will argue that the Twenty-first Amendment does not save 
these durational-residency requirements from Commerce Clause scrutiny. Part I 
of this Comment examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Granholm v. Heald, 
which struck down state statutes that effectively required out-of-state wineries 
to operate in state before they could compete on equal terms with in-state 
wineries. Although the statutes did not impose durational-residency 
requirements, Granholm is the leading case on the interplay between the 
Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause. Part II examines a current 
circuit split between the Eight Circuit and Fifth Circuit. In 2013, the Eighth 
Circuit held that the Twenty-first Amendment saves durational-residency 
requirements for wholesalers from Commerce Clause scrutiny. In 2016, the Fifth 
Circuit held that the Amendment does not authorize durational-residency 
requirements for wholesalers and retailers, and thus the requirements are subject 
to Commerce Clause scrutiny. Part III argues that the Eighth Circuit’s holding 
should be reversed because durational-residency requirements directly regulate 
citizens, and the Twenty-first Amendment only gives States the power to directly 
regulate alcohol products. 
I.  GRANHOLM V. HEALD 
In Granholm, the Supreme Court struck down both Michigan and New York 
statutes that permitted in-state wineries to ship their products directly to in-state 
consumers, but prohibited out-of-state wineries from doing so.18 To obtain this 
preferential treatment and bypass the three-tier system, an out-of-state winery 
needed to set-up an in-state operation. The statutes did not impose durational-
residency requirements.19 Rather, they effectively imposed “physical presence” 
 
 15. Arnold’s Wines, 571 F.3d at 187. 
 16. Professor Marcia Yablon argues that the Twenty-first Amendment was “created to 
effectuate . . . temperance goals.” Marcia Yablon, The Prohibition Hangover: Why We Are Still 
Feeling the Effects of Prohibition, VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & LAW 552, 554 (2006). To effectuate those 
goals, the three-tier system sought to curb consumption by subjecting alcoholic beverages to two 
layers of tax, see, e.g., id., which inevitably leads to higher prices. 
 17. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. When this Comment refers to wholesalers and 
retailers, it is specifically referring to alcohol beverage wholesalers and retailers. 
 18. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 465–66 (2005). 
 19. Although Granholm did not deal with durational-residency requirements, it is the leading 
case on the interplay between the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause. The Eighth 
Circuit relied heavily on the principles and reasoning established in Granholm when it held that the 
Twenty-first Amendment authorized durational-residency requirement for wholesalers. 
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requirements.20 Ultimately, the Court, in a 6–3 decision, held that the statutes 
were not authorized by the Twenty-first Amendment and violated the Commerce 
Clause.21  
A. Michigan and New York Statutes 
In Michigan, most alcoholic beverages must pass through a three-tier 
system.22 Under this system, both in-state and out-of-state producers may sell 
only to licensed in-state wholesalers.23 The wholesalers may sell only to in-state 
retailers, and then in-state retailers sell the alcohol to consumers.24 Thus, 
producers cannot bypass the three-tier system and sell directly to consumers. 
However, the Michigan statute created an exception for in-state wineries, which 
allowed them to bypass the system and sell directly to in-state consumers.25 Out-
of-state wineries did not receive this preferential treatment. Rather, they had to 
first distribute their products through the state’s three-tier system and face the 
inherent disadvantages.26 
In New York, alcohol is also distributed through a three-tier system.27 
However, wineries that produce wine only from New York grapes (i.e., in-state 
wineries)28 qualify for a license allowing them to bypass the three-tier system 
and ship directly to in-state consumers.29 A winery that does not produce wine 
from New York grapes (i.e., an out-of-state winery) can bypass the three-tier 
system only if it becomes a “licensed New York winery.”30 This requires the 
establishment of “a branch factory, office or storeroom within the state of New 
York.”31 Both the New York and Michigan statutes effectively required out-of-
 
 20. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 474. 
 21. Id. at 466. In other words, the statutes did not survive Commerce Clause scrutiny. 
 22. Id. at 468–69. 
 23. Id. at 469. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 469. The statute made only in-state wineries eligible for a license 
to ship directly to in-state consumers. Id. 
 26. See id. at 466. The Court recognized that the statutes at issue put out-of-state wineries at a 
disadvantage from an “economic standpoint.” Id. For example, assume there is one in-state 
producer and one out-of-state producer, and each makes the exact same product. If the product has 
to pass through an in-state wholesaler and an in-state retailer before reaching the consumer, then 
the price of the product is naturally going to rise. But if the in-state producer can skip these steps, 
then it can sell its product cheaper and gain a “competitive advantage” over the out-of-state 
producer. See id. 
 27. Id. at 470. 
 28. The effect of the statute was to benefit in-state wineries because a winery residing in New 
York will most likely use grapes grown in New York. “[T]he result is to allow local wineries to 
make direct sales to consumers in New York on terms not available to out-of-state wineries.” Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 470. 
 31. Id. (quoting N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW ANN. § 3(37) (West. Supp. 2005)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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state wineries to have a “physical presence” in the state before their wine 
received the same treatment as in-state wine.32 
B. Strict Scrutiny Test Triggered 
The Court had “no difficulty” in determining that these statutes 
discriminated against interstate commerce because they gave preferential 
treatment to in-state producers.33 As a result, the statutes “deprive[d] citizens of 
their right to have access to the markets of other States on equal terms.”34  
If a state statute discriminates on its face, in its purpose, or in its effect 
against an out-of-state interest or interstate commerce, then the statute faces a 
“virtually per se rule of invalidity” and a strict scrutiny test is applied.35 In order 
to validate the statute, the State must show that the discriminatory regulation 
“advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by 
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”36 These statutes are routinely struck 
down unless “the discrimination [they impose] is demonstrably justified by a 
valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism.”37 Here, if the challenged 
statutes were not alcohol regulations, the Court would immediately apply a strict 
scrutiny test. 
C. Does the Twenty-First Amendment Save the Statutes from Commerce 
Clause Scrutiny? 
The Court recognized that the statutes faced “a virtually per se rule of 
invalidity.”38 But before applying a strict scrutiny test, the Court considered 
whether Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment saved the statutes.39 The 
Court noted that this section  
“grants the States virtually complete control over whether to permit importation 
or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system.” A State 
which chooses to ban the sale and consumption of alcohol altogether could bar 
its importation; and, as our history shows, it would have to do so to make its 
laws effective. States may also . . . funnel [alcohol] sales through the three-tier 
 
 32. Id. at 474. “Out-of-state wineries . . . face[d] a complete ban on direct shipment.” Id. 
 33. Id. at 476. 
 34. Id. at 473. 
 35. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); see also Granholm, 544 
U.S. at 476. 
 36. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 100–01 (1994) 
(quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 37. New Energy Co. of Ind., 486 U.S. at 274. 
 38. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476 (quoting Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 39. Id. 
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system. We have previously recognized that the three-tier system itself is 
“unquestionably legitimate.”40  
Thus, Section 2 is in tension with the Commerce Clause because it gives the 
States significant power in a particular field of interstate commerce. Resolving 
this tension, the Court held that even though Section 2 gives States power to 
regulate alcohol, it “does not displace the rule that States may not give a 
discriminatory preference to their own producers.”41 The nondiscrimination 
principle of the Commerce Clause still applies to state alcohol regulations.42 
Here, the statutes were a “straightforward” attempt to discriminate against out-
of-state producers, and thus the Twenty-first Amendment did not save them from 
Commerce Clause scrutiny.43  
D. Returning to a Strict Scrutiny Test 
The Court returned to a strict scrutiny test to determine whether the statutes 
“advance[] a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by 
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”44 First, the States proposed that the 
statutes served legitimate state interests by keeping alcohol out of the hands of 
minors because minors have easy access to credit cards and the Internet.45 But 
the States offered no “concrete evidence” that out-of-state wineries shipping to 
in-state consumers will increase alcohol consumption by minors.46 And the 
Court requires the “clearest showing” to justify a discriminatory state statute.47  
Second, New York argued that its statute facilitated tax collection to protect 
against potential lost tax revenue.48 Although the Court recognized that New 
 
 40. Id. at 488–89 (first quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 
445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980); and then quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) 
(Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 41. Id. at 486. 
 42. Id. at 487. 
 43. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489. 
 44. Id. at 489 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 45. Id. at 489–90. The States argued that minors “are likely to take advantage of direct wine 
shipments as a means of obtaining alcohol illegally.” Id. at 489. 
 46. Id. at 490. 
 47. Id. (quoting C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 48. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 491. Michigan advanced a similar argument, but the Court quickly 
recognized it as a “diversion.” Id. Most States rely on wholesalers to collect taxes. Id. The 
wholesalers pay excise tax, and the retailers pay sales tax. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions 
Regarding Alcoholic Beverages Excise Tax, N.C. DEP’T REV., https://files.nc.gov/ncdor/docu 
ments/faq/alcoholfaqs.pdf?YE1DwnS2aR5v7t4ffOo.oom37XBuIOEh [https://perma.cc/U3V7-TZ 
74]. Michigan does not rely on wholesalers to collect taxes. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 491. Instead it 
“collects taxes directly from out-of-state wineries on all wine shipped to in-state wholesalers.” Id. 
It requires out-of-state wineries to submit to the state a tax report of all wine sold. Id. The Court 
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York’s tax collection concern was not “wholly illusory,” this objective could be 
achieved without discriminating against interstate commerce.49 The Court found 
that something as simple as requiring producers to submit regular sales reports 
and pay state taxes based on the reports could achieve New York’s end goal.50 
Other rationales New York and Michigan offered were: “facilitating orderly 
market conditions, protecting public health and safety, and ensuring regulatory 
accountability.”51 Yet, the Court found that these objectives could be achieved 
with a nondiscriminatory alternative (i.e., an “evenhanded licensing 
requirement”).52 Thus, although States have broad power to regulate alcohol 
under Section 2, they must do so on evenhanded terms unless they can 
demonstrate the need for discrimination.53 
E. Granholm Test 
The test, set forth in Granholm, for determining the constitutionality of state 
alcohol regulations can be summarized as follows: the Twenty-first Amendment 
saves state alcohol regulations “when they treat [alcohol] produced out of state 
the same as its domestic equivalent.”54 A regulation requiring out-of-state 
wineries to have an in-state presence if their wine is to receive the same 
treatment as wine from an in-state winery fails this test, and it must survive 
Commerce Clause scrutiny to be deemed constitutional. Although the Court 
made clear that “straightforward attempts” to discriminate, like the New York 
and Michigan statutes, are not saved,55 it provided no examples of non-
straightforward attempts.56 
 
found “[i]f licensing and self-reporting provide adequate safeguards for wine distributed through 
the three-tier system, there is no reason to believe they will not suffice for direct shipments.” Id. 
 49. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 491. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 492. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 493. 
 54. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489. 
 55. Id. 
 56. What would qualify as a non-straightforward attempt, and therefore would be saved by the 
Twenty-first Amendment? The New York and Michigan statutes discriminated, at a minimum, in 
their effect, against interstate commerce because they denied out-of-state residents access to the 
alcohol market on equal terms as in-state residents. The statutes also likely discriminated in their 
purpose—the Court referred to them as “straightforward attempts” to discriminate. Id. Either way, 
the discrimination triggers a strict scrutiny test, and ultimately the Court applied a strict scrutiny 
test. Id. If the Twenty-first Amendment cannot save a state alcohol regulation that triggers strict 
scrutiny, from an application of the strict scrutiny test, what regulations can it save? One clear 
answer is the three-tier system. As Granholm shows, States can require all alcohol products to pass 
through a three-tier distribution system. Id. A statute enforcing the three-tier system without any 
exceptions regulates evenhandedly between in-state and out-of-state producers, but it still arguably 
has some inadvertent or incidental impact on interstate commerce. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. For 
example, in a three-tier system the producer sells to the wholesalers. Marc Sorini, Understanding 
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II.  CIRCUIT SPLIT: EIGHTH CIRCUIT VS. FIFTH CIRCUIT 
A. The Applicability of the Granholm Test Outside the Producer Tier 
The Granholm test focused on the physical product—alcohol; yet, the 
statutes at issue regulated the producers.57 When considering a regulation of the 
producer tier, a test that focuses on the treatment of the product makes sense 
because the producer tier produces the alcohol products. Producers and products 
are so intertwined that a statute regulating one has a direct impact on the other.58 
The test created by Granholm is specifically tied to the producer tier, and it is 
important to recognize that the Granholm test is limited to discrimination 
benefitting alcohol on the basis of its in-state production status. 
Granholm’s test and its focus on the physical product should not extend to 
the wholesaler and retailer tiers because these tiers are inherently different from 
the producer tier.59 A State cannot require all alcohol sold in the state to be 
produced in the state.60 For example, Anheuser-Busch has production operations 
in eleven states, but consumers can buy its products in all fifty states.61 Thus, 
Granholm recognized that producers do not have to be in state, but their products 
may have to pass through the in-state alcohol distribution system before reaching 
 
the Three-Tier System: Its Impact on U.S. Craft Beer and You, CRAFTBEER.COM (Mar. 6, 2017), 
https://www.craftbeer.com/craft-beer-muses/three-tier-system-impacts-craft-beer [https://perma. 
cc/X7YQ-TMQQ]. And a State can require all alcohol to go through licensed in-state wholesalers. 
See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (Scalia, J., concurring). The 
requirement that all alcohol pass through an in-state wholesaler is likely to have an incidental 
impact on out-of-state producers: an out-of-state producer may face greater transportation costs to 
get its product to the wholesaler; an in-state producer may have a better business relationship with 
the in-state wholesaler; or an out-of-state producer may not be able to find an in-state wholesaler 
to do business with. If an out-of-state producer brought an action against the State, the Twenty-first 
Amendment would save the requirement from application of the Pike balancing test. 
 57. The New York statute required out-of-state wineries to create a physical establishment in 
New York in order for their wine to receive the same treatment as wine from in-state wineries. See 
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 470. In Michigan, the winery had to be “in-state” before its products could 
be shipped directly to consumers. See id. at 469. 
 58. For example in Granholm, an out-of-state producer had to set-up an in-state operation 
before its products received equal treatment. Id. at 466. 
 59. For example, imagine there is a state regulation requiring all alcohol sold in the state to be 
produced in the state (I say “imagine” because this regulation would surely not be saved by the 
Twenty-first Amendment). This would be a regulation of products, and it would directly affect 
producers by requiring them to be in state. However, this statute would not have the same impact 
on wholesalers and retailers because they do not produce the product. Wholesalers and retailers 
could still do business in the state, but the pool of producers they could buy alcohol from would be 
greatly reduced. 
 60. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472 (“The mere fact of nonresidence should not foreclose a 
producer in one State from access to markets in other States.”). 
 61. See Anheuser-Busch InBev: Other Locations, BREWERYDB, http://www.brewerydb.com/ 
brewery/BznahA/locations [https://perma.cc/6JW5-2XMG] (showing that Anheuser-Busch has 
twelve production operations throughout eleven states). 
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consumers. So if a State cannot require producers to be in state, but it can subject 
the producer’s products to its distribution laws, then a test focusing on the 
treatment of the products makes sense. The Granholm analysis, and its 
application of the nondiscrimination principle, is still relevant when examining 
a regulation of the wholesaler or producer tier, but it is important to realize why 
the Court’s test focused on the product and not the physical entity producing the 
product. 
Despite the special nature of the producer tier, the Eighth Circuit borrowed 
from the test set forth in Granholm and concluded that a State may condition 
access to the wholesaler tier of its three-tier system on durational-residency. In 
2016, the Fifth Circuit expressly declined to follow the Eighth Circuit and held 
that the Twenty-first Amendment does not authorize durational-residency 
requirements for wholesalers and retailers. 
B. Eighth Circuit: The Twenty-First Amendment Saves Durational-Residency 
Requirements from Commerce Clause Scrutiny 
In Southern Wine & Spirits of America, Inc. v. Division of Alcohol and 
Tobacco Control, the Eighth Circuit upheld a Missouri statute that imposed a 
durational-residency requirement on alcohol wholesalers.62 The statute in 
question provides: “No wholesaler license shall be issued to a corporation for 
the sale of intoxicating liquor containing alcohol in excess of five percent by 
weight, except to a resident corporation as defined in this section.”63 In order to 
qualify as a resident corporation, the corporation must be incorporated under 
Missouri law, and all of its officers and directors must have been “bona fide 
residents” of Missouri for at least three years.64  
The Division of Alcohol and Tobacco Control of the Missouri Department 
of Public Safety (the “Division”) denied Southern Wine & Spirits of Missouri, 
Inc. (“Southern Missouri”) a wholesaler liquor license because the company was 
not a “resident corporation” under Missouri law.65 Southern Missouri’s parent 
company and sole shareholder, Southern Wine & Spirits of America, Inc. 
 
 62. 731 F.3d 799, 812–13 (8th Cir. 2013). 
  Missouri funnels liquor sales through a tier system, separating the distribution market 
into discrete levels: the first tier consists of producers, such as brewers, distillers, and 
winemakers; the second tier is comprised of solicitors, who acquire alcohol from producers 
and sell it “to, by or through” wholesalers; the third tier is made up of wholesalers, who 
purchase alcohol from producers or solicitors and sell it to retailers; and the fourth tier 
consists of retailers, who sell alcohol to consumers. 
Id. at 802 (citing MO. REV. STAT. §§ 311.180(1), 311.200 (2013)). 
 63. MO. REV. STAT. § 311.060.2(3) (emphasis added); see also S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 802. 
 64. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 802; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 311.060.3. 
 65. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 803; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 311.060.2(3). 
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(“SWSA”),66 operates its wholesale alcohol business in thirty-two other states 
and the District of Columbia.67 Even though Southern Missouri is incorporated 
in Missouri, it was not free to do business in Missouri simply because its officers 
and directors were Florida residents.68  
1. Did the Statute Have a Discriminatory Purpose? 
SWSA pointed to a news report quoting one of the legislation’s sponsors 
back in 1947, which said the law “was intended to prevent a few big national 
distillers from monopolizing the wholesale liquor business in Missouri.”69 Thus, 
SWSA argued that the purpose of the statute was “mere economic 
protectionism,”70 and relied on Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias to argue that 
alcohol regulations motivated by protectionist intent are unconstitutional.71 
However, the Eighth Circuit rejected the “mere economic protectionism” 
argument for several reasons.72 
In dismissing this argument, the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on a “purpose 
clause” that was added to the statute in 2007, sixty years after the residency 
requirement was adopted.73 It provides that the purpose of this chapter is “to 
promote responsible consumption, combat illegal underage drinking, and 
achieve other important state policy goals such as maintaining an orderly 
marketplace composed of state-licensed alcohol producers, importers, 
distributors, and retailers.”74 The Eighth Circuit treated this “purpose clause” as 
controlling because SWSA offered no support for the proposition that a later 
legislature “cannot supplant an earlier legislature’s intended purpose by enacting 
an express statutory purpose provision.”75 
 
 66. SWSA, Southern Missouri, and four Florida residents who are officers or directors of 
SWSA and Southern Missouri and shareholders of SWSA (collectively “SWSA”) brought this 
action. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 803. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 807 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 70. Id. (quoting Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 71. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 809. In Bacchus, the Supreme Court ruled that a protectionist tax 
exemption was unconstitutional because it violated a central tenet of the Commerce Clause, and 
“mere economic protectionism” is not a clear concern of the Twenty-first Amendment. Bacchus, 
468 U.S. at 276. SWSA attempted to “sail under the Bacchus flag” and win the day solely under a 
“mere economic protectionism” argument. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 807, 809. 
 72. First, SWSA did not raise this argument at the trial level. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 807. Second, 
newspaper articles are “rank hearsay.” Id. at 807–08. Third, this statement represents only a single 
legislator’s views about the purpose of the residency requirement. Id. at 808. Fourth, the statement 
does not establish the sort of protectionist intent that was conceded by the State in Bacchus. Id. 
 73. Id. at 808. 
 74. MO. REV. STAT. § 311.015 (2013); see also S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 808. 
 75. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 809. 
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2. Eighth Circuit’s Test Helps Twenty-First Amendment Save the 
Statute from Commerce Clause Scrutiny 
After concluding that the statute was not motivated by “mere economic 
protectionism,” the Eighth Circuit’s analysis shifted to whether the Twenty-first 
Amendment gives States the power to require a wholesaler to be an in-state 
resident without running afoul of the Commerce Clause.76 The Eighth Circuit 
combined two Granholm principles and created a test to analyze the residency 
requirement’s constitutionality: “[S]tate policies that define the structure of the 
liquor distribution system while giving equal treatment to in-state and out-of-
state liquor products and producers” are protected from “constitutional 
challenges based on the Commerce Clause.”77 If a state alcohol regulation meets 
this test, then, according to the Eighth Circuit, the Twenty-first Amendment 
saves it. 
The first part of this test, “state policies that define the structure of the liquor 
distribution system,”78 comes from Granholm’s recognition that the three-tier 
system is “unquestionably legitimate.”79 Right after this recognition, Granholm 
quoted Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion from North Dakota v. United States: 
“The Twenty-first Amendment . . . empowers North Dakota to require that all 
liquor sold for use in the State be purchased from a licensed in-state 
wholesaler.”80 Thus, state policies that require wholesalers to be in-state do not 
“run[] afoul of the Commerce Clause.”81 And, according to the Eighth Circuit, 
if States can require wholesalers to be in-state, then they can also define the 
degree of “in-state” presence.82  
The second part of the test, “while giving equal treatment to in-state and 
out-of-state liquor product and producers,”83 comes from Granholm’s test: 
“State policies are protected under the Twenty-first Amendment when they treat 
liquor produced out of state the same as its domestic equivalent.”84 Here, the 
Eighth Circuit held that the Missouri statute “does not discriminate against out-
 
 76. Id. at 810. 
 77. Id. at 809 (emphasis added). 
 78. Id. (emphasis added). 
 79. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005) (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 
U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 80. North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432; see also Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489. 
 81. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 810. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 809 (emphasis added). 
 84. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489. The Eighth Circuit also borrowed the holding from the Second 
Circuit in Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle. “Because New York’s three-tier system treats in-state and 
out-of-state liquor the same, and does not discriminate against out-of-state products or producers, 
we need not analyze the regulation further under Commerce Clause principles.” Arnold’s Wines, 
Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2009). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2017] TWEAKING THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT 273 
of-state liquor products or producers.”85 Ironically, the statute does not regulate 
products or producers—it regulates wholesalers. Thus, because Missouri’s 
durational-residency requirement meets the Eighth Circuit’s two-part test, the 
Twenty-first Amendment protects it from Commerce Clause scrutiny. 
SWSA attacked the first part of this test and contended that the durational-
residency requirement is not “protected” because it is not an “inherent” or 
“integral” part of the alcohol distribution system.86 But according to the Eighth 
Circuit, “[t]here is no archetypal three-tier system from which the ‘integral’ or 
‘inherent’ elements of that system may be gleaned.”87 Even if there was, the 
Supreme Court in Granholm cited “in-state wholesaler” in the first sentence after 
it declared the three-tier system “unquestionably legitimate.”88 Thus, according 
to the Eighth Circuit, it follows that in-state wholesalers must be an “inherent” 
or “integral” part of the three-tier system.89 The Eighth Circuit seems to argue 
that there are no “inherent” or “integral” parts to the three-tier system, and any 
regulation defining the structure of the three-tier system is eligible to be saved 
from Commerce Clause scrutiny. 
3. Rational Basis Test 
For cautionary purposes, the Eighth Circuit proceeded as if the residency 
requirement did not have a protected status.90 Rather than applying a strict 
scrutiny or balancing test, it applied a rational basis test and held that the law 
“passes muster.”91  
The legislature legitimately could believe that a wholesaler governed . . . by 
Missouri residents is more apt to be socially responsible and to promote 
temperance, because the officers, directors, and owners are residents of the 
 
 85. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 810. But the Eighth Circuit does not explain how this statute does not 
discriminate against out-of-state liquor products. It likely reached this conclusion because the 
statute regulates people and not products. 
 86. Id. Granholm insulated from Commerce Clause scrutiny only discrimination that is 
“inherent in the three-tier system itself.” Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809, 
818 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 87. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 810. 
 88. Id.; see also Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 
423, 432 (1982) (Scalia, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 89. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 810. 
 90. Id. at 810–11. 
 91. Id. at 811. The court said the policy is subject to “deferential scrutiny.” Id. Deferential 
scrutiny typically refers to rational basis review. See Jennie S. Stinebaugh, Comment, 
Constitutional Law—Heller v. Doe: The Rational Basis Review Guessing Game, 25 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 329, 331 (1994) (“The rational basis standard is quite deferential, and statutes scrutinized 
under it are presumed to be constitutional and are almost always upheld.”); see also Raphael 
Holoszyc-Pimentel, Note, Reconciling Rational-Basis Review: When Does Rational Basis Bite?, 
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2074 (2015) (“Traditionally, rational-basis review is extremely deferential 
to legislatures’ enactments.”). 
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community and thus subject to negative externalities—drunk driving, domestic 
abuse, underage drinking—that liquor distribution may produce. . . . The 
legislature logically could conclude that in-state residency facilitates law 
enforcement against wholesalers, because it is easier to pursue in-state owners, 
directors, and officers than to enforce against their out-of-state counterparts.92 
Yet, there was doubt as to whether the residency requirement was even rationally 
related to these interests. The deputy state supervisor for the Division, who 
testified on behalf of the Division, could not “‘think of any’ relationship between 
the residency requirement and the safety of Missouri citizens.”93 Additionally, 
Missouri already had one nonresident wholesaler who was grandfathered in.94 
C. Fifth Circuit: The Twenty-First Amendment Does Not Authorize 
Durational-Residency Requirements for Wholesalers and Retailers 
In Cooper v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission, the Fifth Circuit 
expressly declined to follow Southern Wine and held that the Twenty-first 
Amendment does not authorize durational-residency requirements for 
wholesalers and retailers.95 There, plaintiffs could not purchase a nightclub in 
Texas without endangering the club’s alcohol permit because they were out-of-
state residents.96 The Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code (the “Code”) gives the 
Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission (the “Commission”) power to refuse an 
alcohol permit “to any applicant who has not been a citizen of Texas for at least 
one year before filing the application.”97 The Texas Package Stores Association 
(“TPSA”) intervened as defendants.98  
TPSA relied on Southern Wine and argued that the durational-residency 
requirement was constitutional because “[a]ll that the Commerce Clause 
requires . . . is that a [S]tate treat liquor produced out-of-state the same as liquor 
produced in-state.”99 TPSA, like the Eighth Circuit in Southern Wine, drew this 
conclusion from the test set forth in Granholm: “State policies are protected 
under the Twenty-first Amendment when they treat liquor produced out of state 
 
 92. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 811. 
 93. Id. Further, the supervisor noted, “wholesalers have ‘little impact upon’ the ‘direct sale’ 
of alcohol to minors.” Id. 
 94. Id. at 811–12. The existence of a nonresident wholesaler operating in Missouri would seem 
to undercut Missouri’s rationale for imposing the durational-residency requirement. Yet, the Eight 
Circuit determined that “[e]xceptions like grandfather clauses do not, in and of themselves, 
demonstrate the invalidity of rules from which they are carved.” Id. at 812. 
 95. 820 F.3d 730, 743 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 96. Id. at 734. 
 97. Id. (emphasis added). 
 98. Id. at 735. TPSA moved for relief from a permanent injunction entered more than twenty 
years ago that prevented the Commission from enforcing the Code’s residency requirement. Id. at 
730. The question before this court was whether it should continue the injunction in light of 
Granholm. Id. at 740. 
 99. Id. at 743. 
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the same as its domestic equivalent.”100 This conclusion works perfectly for 
TPSA. Here, it was the owners of a nightclub seeking a license.101 The statute 
does not regulate alcohol as an article of commerce. As a result, it automatically 
treats out-of-state and in-state alcohol the same because it all has to pass through 
Texas’ alcohol distribution system before reaching the consumer. 
The Fifth Circuit did not find TPSA’s interpretation persuasive and 
expressly declined to follow Southern Wine.102 It added an important modifier 
to the TPSA’s assertion that “[a]ll . . . the Commerce Clause requires . . . is that 
a [S]tate treat liquor produced out-of-state the same as liquor produced in-
state.”103 The Fifth Circuit held that all the Commerce Clause requires for a state 
regulation of the producer tier is that a State treat alcohol produced out-of-state 
the same as alcohol produced in-state.104 Unlike the producer tier, “state 
regulations of the retailer and wholesaler tiers are not immune from Commerce 
Clause scrutiny just because they do not discriminate against out-of-state 
liquor.”105 The court found that the Twenty-first Amendment does not allow 
States to impose a durational-residency requirement on the owners of alcohol 
retailers and wholesalers because a durational-residency requirement is not an 
“inherent” aspect of the three-tier system.106 
D. Defining the States’ Power Under the Three-Tier System 
The Eighth Circuit provided no limitations on a State’s power to distinguish 
between in-state and out-of-state citizens under the three-tier system.107 Not only 
can Missouri require wholesalers to be in state, it can define the degree of “in-
state” presence.108 However, the Fifth Circuit did provide a limitation: the 
distinction has to be an “inherent aspect” of the three-tier system in order for the 
Twenty-first Amendment to authorize it.109 In Cooper, it held that durational-
residency requirements are not an “inherent aspect.”110 But in Wine Country Gift 
 
 100. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 488–89 (2005); Cooper, 820 F.3d at 743. 
 101. See Cooper, 820 F.3d at 734, 743. 
 102. Id. at 743. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Cooper, 820 F.3d at 743 (“Distinctions between in-state and out-of-state retailers and 
wholesalers are permissible only if they are an inherent aspect of the three-tier system.”). 
 107. The Eighth Circuit believed there were no “inherent” or “integral” aspects of the three-tier 
system. See S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Div. of Alcohol & Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799, 
810 (8th Cir. 2013). Also, the Second Circuit provides no limitations. Any challenge to the three-
tier system is a “frontal attack on the constitutionality of the three-tier system itself.” Arnold’s 
Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 108. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 810. 
 109. Cooper, 820 F.3d at 743. 
 110. Id. 
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Baskets.com v. Steen, the Fifth Circuit held that physical-presence requirements 
for wholesalers and retailers are an “inherent aspect.”111 
1. Fifth Circuit: The Twenty-First Amendment Authorizes Physical-
Presence Requirements for Retailers 
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze whether the Twenty-first 
Amendment saves durational-residency requirements from Commerce Clause 
scrutiny. However, the reasons why the Fifth Circuit upheld a physical-presence 
requirement help draw some boundaries around the States’ power under the 
three-tier system. 
In Wine Country, the Fifth Circuit was presented with a challenge to a state 
statute, which “allow[s] in-state retailers to deliver alcoholic beverages to their 
customers within designated local areas, but forbid[s] out-of-state retailers from 
delivering or shipping alcoholic beverages to customers anywhere in Texas.”112 
Thus, an out-of-state retailer needs an in-state operation to make local deliveries. 
The reason the Fifth Circuit upheld the statute was because the “physical 
location of businesses” is an inherent aspect of the three-tier system.113 The 
“legal residence of owners,” however, is not an inherent aspect.114 This 
distinction is important because it allows the owner of an alcohol retail chain to 
operate in several states. 
The court noted that this statue did not discriminate against out-of-state 
retailers.115 Assuming that the statute still had an inadvertent or incidental 
impact on interstate commerce, the court should have applied a Pike balancing 
test. Thus, the Twenty-first Amendment saved this statute from a Pike balancing 
test. 
III.  WHY THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT SHOULD NOT SAVE DURATIONAL-
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FROM COMMERCE CLAUSE SCRUTINY 
A. Preventing the Practical Effect of the Eighth Circuit’s Holding 
In Granholm, the Supreme Court expressed concern over States enacting 
laws that burden out-of-state citizens.116 It recognized that “States should not be 
 
 111. 612 F.3d 809, 821 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 112. Id. at 812. 
 113. Id. at 821. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 820. “Granholm prohibited discrimination against out-of-state products or 
producers. Texas has not tripped over that bar by allowing in-state retailer deliveries. Yet it also 
has not discriminated among retailers.” Id. The remedy sought was allowing in-state retailers to 
ship anywhere in Texas because local retailers can deliver within their counties. Id. This would 
give out-of-state retailers “dramatically greater rights than Texas ones.” Id. 
 116. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005). (“States may not enact laws that burden 
out-of-state producers or shippers simply to give a competitive advantage to in-state businesses.”). 
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compelled to negotiate with each other regarding favored or disfavored status 
for their own citizens.”117 That is why we have a rule prohibiting improper state 
discrimination against interstate commerce—it is “essential to the foundations 
of the Union.”118 It was a central concern of the Framers because “economic 
Balkanization . . . had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the 
States under the Articles of Confederation.”119 The nondiscrimination principle 
of the Commerce Clause prevents rivalries among the States and the 
“proliferation of trade zones.”120 Other Supreme Court cases examining state 
alcohol regulations have expressed this concern: 
[T]he practical effect of the statute must be evaluated not only by considering 
the consequences of the statute itself, but also by considering how the challenged 
statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of other States and 
what effect would arise if not one, but many or every, State adopted similar 
legislation.121 
 The practical effect of allowing Missouri to require all officers and directors 
of a wholesale company to be Missouri residents for at least three years is that it 
allows other States to pass similar laws. Hypothetically, if every State passed 
similar laws, alcohol wholesalers could never gain a license to operate in more 
than one state.  
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to prevent this 
result from happening in the future. After the Fifth Circuit held that the Twenty-
first Amendment does not authorize durational-residency requirements, TPSA 
filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.122 On November 
28, 2016, the Supreme Court denied the petition.123 
Future courts should follow the Fifth Circuit and hold that the Twenty-first 
Amendment does not authorize durational-residency requirements for 
wholesalers and retailers. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
recognized, the Twenty-first Amendment should not save laws that directly 
regulate the owners of alcohol retailer and wholesaler companies124 simply 
because the laws treat in-state and out-of-state alcohol the same. Durational-
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1979)). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). 
 122. Texas Package Stores Assoc., Inc. v. Fine Wine and Spirits of North Texas, LLC, 
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/texas-package-stores-assoc-inc-v-
fine-wine-and-spirits-of-north-texas-llc/ [https://perma.cc/T8BQ-MCT8]. 
 123. Tex. Package Stores Ass’n, Inc. v. Fine Wine & Spirits of N. Tex., LLC, 820 F.3d 730 
(5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 85 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2016) (No. 16-242); see also 
SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 122. 
 124. For the remainder of this Comment, when “citizens” is used it refers to the owners of 
alcohol retailer and wholesaler companies. 
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residency requirements should not be able to evade Commerce Clause scrutiny 
so easily. The Fifth Circuit’s ruling was correct because it distinguished between 
products and citizens.125 
The Missouri statute in Southern Wine should be, at a minimum, subjected 
to strict scrutiny because the Twenty-first Amendment intended to provide a 
shield only for state laws regulating alcohol products, not citizens. And, even if 
it did intend to cover citizens, the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning for why the 
nondiscrimination principle does not apply takes the Granholm reasoning one 
step too far. 
1. The Twenty-First Amendment Only Gives States the Power to 
Regulate Products, Not Citizens 
The Twenty-first Amendment only gives States the power to regulate the 
“transportation or importation” of “intoxicating liquors”126 because the 
Amendment only intended to give “dry” States the power to be dry. The 
Commerce Clause prevented States from subjecting out-of-state alcohol to the 
same laws as in-state alcohol. So a “dry” State could not truly be “dry” because 
alcohol crossing state lines had interstate immunity. As a result, Congress 
proposed to remove the interstate “immunity” from alcohol products, not 
citizens involved in the alcohol market.  
a. Legislative Intent 
Before Prohibition, the States’ “police powers” allowed them to ban the 
production of domestic alcohol.127 But a State that wished to be “dry” had no 
power to prevent liquor from entering its borders because the dormant 
Commerce Clause prevented the States from improperly burdening interstate 
commerce.128 So in 1890, Congress passed the Wilson Act, which empowered 
States to regulate imported liquor “to the same extent and in the same manner as 
though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory.”129 
It did not allow States to discriminate against out-of-state liquor.130 However, 
 
 125. “The Twenty-first Amendment does not, however, authorize states to impose a durational-
residency requirement on the owners of alcoholic beverage retailers and wholesalers.” Cooper v. 
Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 820 F.3d 730, 743 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 126. U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2. 
 127. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 671 (1887) (“The state [has the] authority to prohibit 
the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors . . . .”). 
 128. Ethan P. Davis, Liquor Laws and Constitutional Conventions: A Legal History of the 
Twenty-first Amendment 7 (Apr. 1, 2008) (unpublished Yale Law School paper) (available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1065&context=student_papers 
[https://perma.cc/SUA7-PAD8]) (“Because of the dormant Commerce Clause . . . dry states were 
powerless to erect legal barriers to the importation of alcohol from out-of-state.”). 
 129. Wilson Act, 26 Stat. 313, 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1890); see also Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 
460, 478 (2005). 
 130. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 478. 
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the Supreme Court gave the Wilson Act a restricted construction and held that 
the Act authorized States to regulate only the resale of imported liquor.131 Thus, 
States had no power to regulate alcohol that entered its border in its “original 
package.”132 This loophole prevented States from imposing their laws on alcohol 
products involved in interstate commerce.  
In order to close this loophole, Congress passed the Webb-Kenyon Act in 
1913. The Act prohibited “[t]he shipment or transportation” of alcohol into a 
state that is intended “to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used, 
either in the original package or otherwise, in violation of any law of such State 
. . . .”133 One of the law’s principal sponsors, Senator William S. Kenyon, said 
that the bill’s “only purpose” was “to remove the impediment existing as to the 
States in the exercise of their police powers regarding the traffic or control of 
intoxicating liquors within their borders.”134 Like the Wilson Act, it did not 
allow discrimination against articles of interstate commerce.135 Rather, it simply 
removed “all immunities of liquor in interstate commerce.”136 Thus, a “dry” 
State could prevent alcohol from entering its borders as long as it banned the 
manufacture and sale of alcohol within its borders. 
At the time Congress was discussing proposals to repeal the Eighteenth 
Amendment, States that wished to be “dry” worried that the Webb-Kenyon Act 
 
 131. See Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 423 (1898) (“[T]he provisions of the act were intended 
by congress to cause the legislative authority of the respective states to attach to intoxicating liquors 
coming into the states by an interstate shipment, only after the consummation of the shipment, but 
before the sale of the merchandise; that is, that the one receiving merchandise of the character 
named should, while retaining the full right to use the same, no longer enjoy the right to sell free 
from the restrictions as to sale created by state legislation . . . .”). 
In other words, the court held that the interstate-commerce clause—that is, the power of 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce—attached to that commodity not only before it 
entered the State but after it entered the State . . . until the commodity or intoxicating liquor 
was in fact delivered to the cosignee. 
76 CONG. REC. 4140 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine). 
 132. See Rhodes, 170 U.S. at 423–24. 
 133. Webb-Kenyon Act, 49 Stat. 877, 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1935) (originally enacted as Act of 
Mar. 1, 1913, ch. 90, § 1, 37 Stat. 699). 
 134. 49 CONG. REC. 707 (1912) (statement of Sen. Kenyon). 
 135. The Webb-Kenyon Act did not repeal the Wilson Act, which expressly proscribed 
discrimination. If Congress, through the Webb-Kenyon Act, wanted to authorize States to 
discriminate against out-of-state goods, then it would have repealed the Wilson Act. 
 136. 76 CONG. REC. 4140 (1933) (statement of Sen. Wagner) (emphasis added). 
Mr. WAGNER: I do not want to enter into a controversy, because it really is not very 
important, but I do not think the Senator meant to say that by this act Congress delegated 
to the States the power to regulate interstate commerce; Congress itself regulated interstate 
commerce to the point of removing all immunities of liquor in interstate commerce. 
Mr. BLAINE: I thank the Senator. I think he has given the correct statement of the doctrine. 
76 CONG. REC. 4140 (1933) (statement of Sen. Wagner) (statement of Sen. Blaine). 
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would not provide sufficient protection.137 There was nothing to prevent the 
Supreme Court from narrowly interpreting this Act to make the States’ power 
meaningless. Senator John J. Blaine represented the Joint Resolution Committee 
when proposing the Twenty-first Amendment to Congress.138 He recognized 
that the Webb-Kenyon Act was sustained by a divided court and wanted “to 
assure the so-called dry States against the importation of intoxicating liquor into 
those States.”139 To provide this assurance, Congress intended to write the 
Webb-Kenyon Act into the Constitution.140 Its vehicle was Section 2 of the 
Twenty-first Amendment.  
When our Government was organized and the Constitution of the United States 
adopted, the States surrendered control over and regulation of interstate 
commerce. [Section 2] is restoring to the States, in effect, the right to regulate 
commerce respecting a single commodity–namely, intoxicating liquor. In other 
words, the State is not surrendering any power that it possesses, but rather, by 
reason of this provision, in effect acquires powers that it has not at this time.141 
Thus, Congress only intended to give States the power “to regulate commerce 
respecting a single commodity.”142 Section 2 “restored to the States the power 
they had under the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts,”143 namely the power to 
prevent the importation of alcohol, not citizens of other states. Notably, because 
the Acts did not authorize discrimination, the power to prevent imports was only 
effective if the State also banned the manufacture and sale of alcohol within its 
borders.  
 
 137. The constitutionality of the Act was in doubt. In fact, President Taft vetoed it because he 
believed it was an unlawful delegation of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers. Davis, supra note 
128, at 12. However, Congress overrode the veto. Id. The Act survived a constitutional challenge 
in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Co. 242 U.S. 311, 330, 332 (1917). But it was 
only a 2-2 vote. Id. at 332. 
 138. See 76 CONG. REC. 4141 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine) (“Now, Mr. President, I think 
I have set forth . . . the view of the committee as expressed in this joint resolution.”); see also S.J. 
Res. 211, 72nd Cong. (1932). 
 139. 76 CONG. REC. 4141 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine). 
 140. Id. 
The committee felt that since the Congress had acted and had definitely legislated upon this 
question, while that legislation had been sustained by the Supreme Court, yet it was 
sustained by a divided court, and that we could well afford to guarantee to the so-call dry 
States the protection designed by section 2. 
Id.; see also Davis, supra note 128, at 4, 12 (confirming that the Twenty-first Amendment was 
intended to constitutionalize the Webb-Kenyon Act). 
 141. 76 CONG. REC. 4141 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine) (emphasis added). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 484 (2005). 
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b. Textual Analysis 
Congress’ intent to constitutionalize the Webb-Kenyon Act is further 
evidenced by the language of Section 2, which resembles that of the Webb-
Kenyon Act. The Webb-Kenyon Act regulated the “shipment or transportation” 
of alcohol “to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used . . . in violation 
of any law of such State.”144 Section 2 regulates the “transportation or 
importation into any State . . . for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, 
in violation of the laws thereof.”145 This resemblance is evidence of “the 
framers’ clear intention of constitutionalizing the Commerce Clause framework 
established under those statutes.”146  
The language “shipment or transportation” and “transportation or 
importation” indicates that Congress wanted to give States the power to prevent 
alcohol products from entering their borders. This intention is further shown by 
Congress’ desire to protect “dry” States.147 However, once a State opens its 
alcohol market, it may not open it only to in-state interests.148 
If anything, Section 2 reaches more narrowly than the Webb-Kenyon Act. 
The Webb-Kenyon Act refers to alcohol that is “to be received, possessed, sold, 
or in any manner used.”149 Section 2 only refers to “delivery or use.”150 And the 
Webb-Kenyon Act was not even a grant of interstate commerce power to the 
States.151 It only removed the interstate immunity from alcohol.152 If Congress 
only intended to remove the interstate character from alcohol, and nothing else, 
then it does not follow that Congress intended to give States power to impose 
durational-residency requirements on alcohol wholesalers and retailers. 
 
 144. Webb-Kenyon Act, 49 Stat. 877, 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1935) (originally enacted as Act of 
Mar. 1, 1913, ch. 90, § 1, 37 Stat. 699). 
 145. U.S. CONST. amend XXI, § 2. 
 146. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 484 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 147. See 76 CONG. REC. 4170 (1933) (statement of Sen. Borah) (“[A]s I understand, this is the 
question of striking out section 2, which provides for the protection of the so-called dry States.”); 
76 CONG. REC. 4171 (1933) (statement of Sen. Wagner) (“[I]f the dry States want additional 
assurance that they will be protected I shall have no objection.”); 76 CONG. REC. 4518 (1933) 
(statement of Rep. Robinson) (“Section 2 attempts to protect dry States.”); 76 CONG. REC. 4519 
(1933) (statement of Rep. Garber) (“Section 2 prohibits the transportation or importation of 
intoxicating liquors for delivery or use into any of the several States where the laws of the State 
prohibit such. This section, it is claimed, will protect dry States.”); 76. CONG. REC. 4526 (1933) 
(statement of Rep. Tierney) (“[Section 2] will aid and protect the so-called dry States in permitting 
them to exclude, if their citizens so wish, all liquor traffic in their domains.”). 
 148. Peoples Super Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Jenkins, 432 F. Supp. 2d 200, 221 (D. Mass. 2006) 
(“Granholm cannot be held to sanction protectionist policies at any of the tiers.”). 
 149. 27 U.S.C. § 122. 
 150. U.S. CONST. amend XXI, § 2. 
 151. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 481–82. 
 152. Id. at 482. 
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c. The Indirect Effect of Regulating Products 
Naturally, the Twenty-first Amendment gives the States power to indirectly 
regulate citizens by subjecting their products to state laws. In Granholm, if New 
York and Michigan required all alcohol to pass through the three-tier system, 
then the statutes would indirectly regulate producers by requiring their products 
to pass through the three-tier system. The Twenty-first Amendment authorizes 
this.153  
Unlike the producer tier, the wholesaler and retailer tiers do not produce 
alcohol. However, they are responsible for the “transportation or importation” 
of alcohol into a state for the “delivery or use therein.”154 If a State requires all 
retail sales of alcohol to be over-the-counter, for example, then the indirect effect 
is that the retailer needs a physical location in the state. That is why the “physical 
locations of businesses” is an inherent aspect of the three-tier system.155 It is an 
extension of the States’ power to regulate products. Thus, “[w]hen analyzing 
whether a State’s alcoholic beverage regulation discriminates under the dormant 
Commerce Clause, a beginning premise is that wholesalers may be required to 
be within the State.”156 Imposing durational-residency requirements, however, 
is not a natural extension of the States’ power to directly regulate alcohol 
products. 
2. The Eighth Circuit Misapplied the Reasoning in Granholm in Two 
Key Ways 
Even if it is conceded that the Twenty-first Amendment gave the States 
power to directly regulate citizens, the Eighth Circuit took Granholm one step 
too far when it gave Missouri’s durational-residency requirement a “protected” 
status.157 The statute achieved this “protected” status because it met the Eighth 
Circuit’s two-pronged test. 
a. The Statute Did Not Discriminate Against Out-of-State Alcohol 
Products 
Missouri’s statute directly regulated the officers and directors of alcohol 
wholesaler companies. Yet, the Eighth Circuit gave the statute a “protected” 
status because it gave equal treatment to out-of-state products and producers.158 
A statute that only targets the officers and directors of a wholesale company and 
 
 153. For a discussion on the impact the three-tier system has on out-of-state producers, see 
supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 154. U.S. CONST. amend XXI, § 2. 
 155. See Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809, 821 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 156. Id. at 820. 
 157. S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Div. of Alcohol & Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799, 809, 
810 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 158. Id. 
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does not even mention products and producers, is not going to discriminate 
against out-of-state products and producers. The Eighth Circuit took a protection 
that Granholm established for the producer tier,159 and then applied it to the 
wholesaler tier without providing a rationale. This jump cannot be made because 
the statutes in Granholm regulated producers, who produce the product.160 
Hence, the holding: “State policies are protected under the Twenty-first 
Amendment when they treat liquor produced out of state the same as its 
domestic equivalent.”161 The Missouri statute in Southern Wine regulated 
citizens. So the holding, “state policies are protected . . . when they treat liquor 
produced out of state the same as its domestic equivalent,”162 does not logically 
follow.  
The Fifth Circuit recognized the Eighth Circuit’s error when it held that 
“state regulations of the retailer and wholesaler tiers are not immune from 
Commerce Clause scrutiny just because they do not discriminate against out-of-
state liquor.”163 The Eighth Circuit even interpreted Granholm as drawing “a 
bright line between the producer tier and the rest of the system.”164 But it still 
took a protection for the producer tier and applied it to the wholesaler tier. 
Further, Granholm never examined state alcohol regulations at the wholesaler 
or retailer tiers. Thus, if it wished to establish this precedent, it would have stated 
that this protection applies to the wholesaler and retailer tier.  
b. The Statute Hid Behind Missouri’s Distribution System 
The Eighth Circuit recognized that the nondiscrimination principle applies 
to products and producers, but it did not apply the nondiscrimination principle 
to wholesalers. It should have examined whether the statute discriminated 
against out-of-state wholesalers. The Eighth Circuit likely chose not to apply an 
important Commerce Clause principle because of the citation right after the 
Supreme Court declared that the three-tier system is “unquestionably 
legitimate.”165 It cited to one of its previous cases, North Dakota v. United 
States, and included a quote from Justice Scalia’s concurrence: “The Twenty-
 
 159. Id. Granholm held that “[s]tate policies are protected under the Twenty-first Amendment 
when they treat liquor produced out of state the same as its domestic equivalent.” Granholm v. 
Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005). 
 160. Id. at 469. The statutes at issue in Granholm required out-of-state wine to pass through the 
state’s three-tier system before reaching consumers. Id. at 468. The effect of this was that out-of-
state wineries could only sell their products directly to consumers if they became an in-state winery. 
Id. at 469. 
 161. Id. at 489. 
 162. See id. 
 163. Cooper v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 820 F.3d 730, 43 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 164. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 810. 
 165. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 
(1982) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
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first Amendment . . . empowers North Dakota to require that all liquor sold for 
use in the State be purchased from a licensed in-state wholesaler.”166 Based on 
this, the Eighth Circuit asserted: “If it is beyond question that States may require 
wholesalers to be ‘in-state’ without running afoul of the Commerce Clause, then 
we think States have flexibility to define the requisite degree of ‘in-state’ 
presence . . . .”167 However, North Dakota v. United States was a plurality 
opinion.168 And the quote cited by the Supreme Court was from a concurring 
opinion in which no other Justice joined. This is too weak of a foundation on 
which to rest such a strong assertion as the Eighth Circuit advanced. 
Further, the Eighth Circuit believes that there are no “inherent” or “integral” 
parts of the three-tier system, and any regulation defining the structure of the 
system is saved.169 But there has to be some limitation on these regulations. The 
States have some room to burden out-of-state interests.170 But it is not an 
unlimited power. For cautionary purposes, the Eighth Circuit held that an in-
state wholesaler is an “inherent” part of the three-tier system.171 However, the 
Eighth Circuit never argued that an in-state wholesaler who has been a resident 
for at least three years is an “inherent” aspect. 
The Eighth Circuit took a protection that Granholm created for the producer 
tier and then applied it to the wholesaler tier. It then decided not to apply the 
nondiscrimination principle. The Eighth Circuit should not be able to pick and 
choose. 
B. Subjecting Missouri’s Statute to Strict Scrutiny 
As argued in Section III.A, the Twenty-first Amendment should not save 
Missouri’s durational-residency requirement. Thus, because the statute, at a 
minimum, discriminates in its effect, the next step is to determine whether the 
statute advances “a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by 
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”172 Like New York and Michigan in 
Granholm, the burden is on Missouri to make the “clearest showing” that the 
discrimination is necessary by offering “concrete evidence.”173 Missouri would 
argue that:  
[A] wholesaler governed . . . by Missouri residents is more apt to be socially 
responsible and to promote temperance, because the officers, directors, and 
owners are residents of the community and thus subject to negative 
 
 166. Id. (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (Scalia, J., 
concurring)). 
 167. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 810. 
 168. See North Dakota, 495 U.S. 423. 
 169. See S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 810. 
 170. See discussion of Wine Country, supra Section II.D.1. 
 171. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 810. 
 172. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) 
 173. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 490 (2005). 
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externalities—drunk driving, domestic abuse, underage drinking—that liquor 
distribution may produce. Missouri residents . . . are more likely to respond to 
concerns of the community, as expressed by their friends and neighbors whom 
they encounter day-to-day . . . . [I]n-state residency facilitates law enforcement 
against wholesalers, because it is easier to pursue in-state owners, directors, and 
officers than to enforce against their out-of-state counterparts.174 
 However, the deputy state supervisor for the Division, who testified on 
behalf of the Division, said that “wholesalers have little impact upon the direct 
sale of alcohol to minors, and that he could not think of any relationship between 
the residency requirement and the safety of Missouri citizens.”175 But even if 
Missouri can provide “concrete evidence” that the durational-residency 
requirement actually serves the above purposes, it still would not survive strict 
scrutiny. Granholm held that “rationales, such as facilitating orderly market 
conditions, protecting public health and safety, and ensuring regulatory 
accountability” can be achieved though non-discriminatory alternatives.176 
Being subject to the negative externalities that liquor distribution may produce 
is not necessary for someone to be socially responsible. There are less 
discriminatory ways to require wholesalers to be socially responsible. 
Additionally, in this modern era, “conducting an interstate investigation would 
seem just as easy as conducting an intrastate one,”177 and “improvements in 
technology have eased the burden of monitoring out-of-state [citizens].”178 
Thus, the legitimate local purposes proposed by Missouri can be achieved 
through less discriminatory alternatives. 
C. Privileges and Immunities Clause 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides an alternative basis for challenging durational-residency requirements. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . . 179 
One privilege and immunity for U.S. citizens is the right to travel. The Supreme 
Court has defined this as “the right of the newly arrived citizen to the same 
privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the same State.”180 In 
 
 174. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 811. 
 175. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 176. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492. 
 177. Glazer’s Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., v. Kansas, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1243 (D. Kan. 2001). 
 178. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492. 
 179. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 180. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999) (“Permissible justifications for discrimination 
between residents and nonresidents are simply inapplicable to a nonresident’s exercise of the right 
to move into another State and become a resident of that State.”). 
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other words, the citizen of State A, who elects to become a permanent resident 
of State B, has the right to be treated like other citizens of State B. The citizen 
of State A should not have to wait three years to be treated like other citizens of 
State B. “Neither mere rationality nor some intermediate standard of review 
should be used to judge the constitutionality of a state rule that discriminates 
against some of its citizens because they have been domiciled in the State for 
less than a year.”181 Thus, the Privileges and Immunities Clause is an alternative 
path that alcohol beverage wholesalers and retailers can use to subject 
durational-residency requirements to strict scrutiny. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Granholm recognized that today, alcohol is 
viewed as “an ordinary article of commerce, subject to substantially the same 
market and legal controls as other consumer products.”182 But back when the 
Twenty-first was passed, alcohol was known as “demon rum” and millions of 
Americans condemned its use.183 The circumstances that justified the passage of 
the Twenty-first Amendment are not as evident today. There is no longer a 
legitimate state interest in the alcohol market. Even if there was, durational-
residency requirements do not advance it. This Comment does not propose that 
the Twenty-first Amendment serves no purpose in our day and age. Further, it 
does not propose a rewriting of the Amendment to expressly narrow the States’ 
power. Rather, this Comment urges courts to follow the holding of the Fifth 
Circuit when analyzing the constitutionality of durational-residency 
requirements for alcohol wholesalers and retailers. From Young’s Market Co.184 
to Granholm, the States’ reach under the Twenty-first Amendment has been 
narrowed. It is time for future courts to finish the job and subject durational-
residency requirements to Commerce Clause scrutiny. 
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 183. Id. at 496. 
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